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A R T I C L E
Reflecting on the Value of Socially
Responsible Practices Post the
Takeover of Cadbury PLC by Kraft
Foods Inc: Implications for the
Revision of the EU Takeover Directive
G E O R G I N A T S A G A S

1. INTRODUCTION
One of the less discussed proposals in the overall debate on the
potential revision of the EU Takeover Directive1 is the inclusion of
provisions that would safeguard firms’ socially responsible beha-
viour from a change in corporate control. A turnover in corporate
control may equate a vast and vicious change in the corporate
strategies previously observed by the target firm, including a shift
away from preceding Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policies
and commitments towards various stakeholders.2 Whether firms
should engage in socially responsible activities and whether it is the
role of the market or the state to correct the externalities that
corporations create has been the subject of a much broader debate
focusing on CSR.3 Building a strong case for or against CSR has
proven hard, as the economic benefits or detriments that may stem
from CSR, respectively, are often difficult to quantify.4 CSR practices
are, however, adopted by various corporations worldwide more so
today than ever in the past.5 The takeover of certain socially
responsible companies by multinational companies validates argu-
ments purporting that business ethics are important in today’s
business world and may complement financial performance rather
than undermine it.6
The paper will discuss whether the law should ‘step in’ to safe-
guard CSR practices previously set in place by the target firm post a
successful takeover and if so, whether alterations should be made to
the Takeover Directive’s current provisions. Section 2 begins by
addressing the European Commission’s 2011 definition of the term
CSR. Following, in section 3, reference will be made to the stake-
holder focused provisions found in the EU Takeover Directive. Legal
gaps and ambiguous concepts will be identified. The takeover of
Cadbury PLC by US multinational Kraft Foods Inc. in 2010 led to the
questioning of the UK’s open market for corporate control and
brought stakeholders’ interests, corporations’ long-term growth, and
CSR practices into the spotlight. Reference to the Cadbury’s takeover
as a paradigm in section 4 will suggest that the reform of the UK
Takeover Rules in September 20117 in favour of a more long-term,
stakeholder-friendly interpretation of the rules is likely to have an
impact on the potential revision of the equivalent EU rules in time to
come. Section 5 of the paper will analyse the impediments to the
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1 Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 21 Apr. 2004 on Takeover Bids.
2 A. Shleifer & L.H. Summers, ‘Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers’, in Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences, ed. A.J. Auerbach (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1988), 37–42.
3 R. Benabou & J. Tirole, ‘Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility’, IZA Discussion Paper No. 4570, available at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract¼1515117>, 1.
4 A white paper from the Economist Intelligence Unit, sponsored by Oracle, ‘The Importance of Corporate Responsibility’ (January 2005), 22, available at <http://graphics.eiu.com/
files/ad_pdfs/eiuOracle_CorporateResponsibility_WP.pdf>.
5 O. Ralph, ‘All Change: Long-Term Success Requires Flexibility and Co-operation’, The Financial Times, 10 Oct. 2011; The Economist, ‘The Next Question: Does CSR Work?’,
17 Jan. 2008; Benabou and Tirole, supra n. 3, 1–2; J.L. Campbell, ‘Why Would Corporations Behave in Socially Responsible Ways? An Institutional Theory of Corporate Social
Responsibility’, Academy of Management Review 32, no. 3 (2007): 947.
6 D. Veljkovic´ & D. Petrovic´, ‘The Role of Corporate Image in the Process of Company Takeovers’, Megatrend Review 8, no. 1 (2011): 77–94, 88; For characteristic examples of such
acquisitions, see L’Oreal’s acquisition of Body Shop in 2000 and Cadbury’s acquisition of Green & Blacks in 2005; note that from an opposite standpoint, however, it can be
perceived that socially responsible companies are, by definition, underperforming and are taken over because they have a financial potential for being managed much better.
7 The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, 10th edn, available at <www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/Code_190911.pdf>, 19 Sep. 2011.
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symbiosis of CSR and takeovers and discuss whether both objectives
of promoting CSR and facilitating takeovers can co-exist. The final
part of the paper, section 6, will consider whether a claim to revise
the EU Takeover Directive encompassing safeguards towards socially
responsible practices and firm-specific investments merits value and
discuss how such a proposal can be achieved.
2. CSR AND LONG-TERM GROWTH
The Commission in its 2011 Report provides a generic definition of
CSR by redefining it as the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts
on society.8 On 25 October 2011, the European Commission
approved a new9 European strategy on corporate social responsibil-
ity, finding that it was vital to renew its efforts in promoting CSR in
light of the social consequences stemming from the 2008 financial
crisis.10 Arguments put forward by the Commission in favour of
enterprises adopting CSR polices are that CSR benefits the enter-
prises as such, as well as society as a whole.11 According to the
Commission’s Report, the corporation’s aim should be to maximize
the creation of shared value for shareholders, as well as other stake-
holders and society at large, and to identify, prevent, and mitigate
possible adverse impacts on society.12 In its Report, the European
Commission acknowledges that in promoting the adoption of CSR
practises, it is important to enhance market rewards for CSR in view
of the fact that those in charge of corporate decisions are often faced
with the dilemma of behaving socially responsibly when such an
undertaking would not necessarily be the most financially beneficial
option in the short term.13 In relation to investment in particular,
the Commission stresses its commitment to support ‘capacity-
building for investors on how to integrate non-financial information
into investment decisions’, as it is considered that were investors take
into account relevant non-financial information this would likely
contribute to ‘a more efficient allocation of capital and better achieve
longer-term investment goals’.14
In its 2011 Report, the European Commission purports that in
order to achieve the maximization of shareholder value, enterprises
need to adopt a long-term, strategic approach towards CSR.15 In the
Report, the Commission further recognizes that in order to further
develop its CSR policy, there is a need to adopt a balanced multi-
stakeholder approach, to clarify what is expected of enterprises, to
promote market reward for responsible business conduct, to address
company transparency on social and environmental issues from the
point of view of all stakeholders, and to acknowledge the role of
complementary regulation in creating an environment that prompts
corporations to voluntarily assume social responsibility.16
3. THE VALUE OF THE TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE’S STAKEHOLDER-
ORIENTED PROVISIONS
The Takeover Directive contains provisions that aim first and fore-
most to provide shareholders with enough information on the bid so
as to make an informed decision when exercising their right to exit
the company by tendering their shares. This is realized by informa-
tion on the bid being effectively transmitted to the shareholders of the
offeree company. The provisions are not a guarantee that share-
holders are to be protected from bids that may be improper or
opportunistic or from bids that would negatively impact on the
company’s socially responsible behaviour towards employees, con-
sumers, and/or the environment. A closer look at the provisions will
give an insight of the minimal value that the said provisions have in
safeguarding shareholders’, as well as stakeholders’ interests.
Recital 17, Article 3(1)(b), Article 3(1)(c), and Article 9(5) of the
EU Takeover Directive are all provisions that stipulate the duties that
the offeree board of directors owes to the shareholders of the offeree
company. The board is under a duty to give its opinion on the bid
and the reasons on which that opinion is based, including its views on
the effects of implementation on all the company’s interests, with
particular reference made to the effects of the bid on employment,
conditions of employment, and the locations of the company’s places
of business.17 This information will then be communicated to the
representatives of the company’s employees or, where there are no
such representatives, to the employees themselves.18 Article 3(1)(c),
in particular, stipulates that:
the board of an offeree company must act in the interests of the
company as a whole and must not deny the holders of securities
the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid.
Article 6 stipulates the duties that need be observed by the offeror
with regard to the information provided to the offeree company’s
shareholders. An offeror is required to
8 Communication from the Commission: A Renewed EU Strategy 2011–2014 for Corporate Social Responsibility (2011), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/
sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/index_en.htm>, 4.
9 For former definition of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) provided by the European Commission, see European Commission, ‘Promoting a European Framework for
Corporate Social Responsibility’, Green Paper, 2001, COM(2001) 366 final; for the acknowledgment of the social dimension of the firm at EU level, see I.L. Fannon, ‘Working
within Two Kinds of Capitalism: Corporate Governance and Employee Stakeholding, US and EC Perspectives’, Contemporary Studies in Corporate Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2003), 36.
10 Communication from the Commission: A Renewed EU Strategy 2011–2014 for Corporate Social Responsibility (2011), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/
sustainable-business/corporate-social-responsibility/index_en.htm>, 4.
11 Ibid., 3.
12 Ibid., 6.
13 Ibid., 10–11.
14 Ibid., 10–11.
15 Ibid., 6.
16 Ibid., 5.
17 Art. 3(1)(b) General Principles; also see Art. 9(5) of the Directive and Recital 17 of the Directive.
18 Article 9(5) of the EU Takeover Directive.
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draw up and make public in good time an offer document
containing the information necessary to enable the holders of the
offeree company’s securities to reach a properly informed deci-
sion on the bid . . . When it is made public, the boards of the
offeree company and of the offeror shall communicate it to the
representatives of their respective employees or, where there are
no such representatives, to the employees themselves.
According to paragraph three of the same article, the offer
document should contain information that includes:
the offeror’s intentions with regard to the future business of the
offeree company and, in so far as it is affected by the bid, the
offeror company and with regard to the safeguarding of the jobs
of their employees and management, including any material
change in the conditions of employment, and in particular the
offeror’s strategic plans for the two companies and the likely
repercussions on employment and the locations of the compa-
nies’ places of business;19
Finally, Article 14 affords particular attention to the information
for and consultation of employees’ representatives by providing that
the Directive applies without prejudice to the rules relating to
information and to consultation of representatives governed by the
relevant national provisions and, in particular, those adopted
pursuant to Directives 94/45/EC, 98/59/EC, 2001/86/EC, and 2002/
14/EC.
An attempt was made by the European Parliament to analyse the
concept of ‘company as a whole’ as meaning ‘the interest of corpo-
rate policy and its continuation, shareholders and staff, and with a
view to safeguarding jobs’.20 This term was not however endorsed by
the Commission on the basis that defining the concept fell outside of
the takeover regulation’s objectives, which resulted in an undefined
and arguably vague expression of ‘company as a whole’ to form part
of the article as found in the Directive’s provisions at present.21 The
intentional vagueness attached to this provision in its current form is
also reaffirmed by the fact that in earlier drafts of the Directive, there
existed a General Principle 3(2)(c) whereby a duty was imposed on
target directors to ‘act in all the interest of the company, including
employment’. This also, however, did not manage to form part of the
current text.22 One of the assumptions found in theWinter Report, of
course, is that the discipline of management and relocation of com-
pany resources through the takeover process is ‘in the long term in
the bests interests of all stakeholders and society at large’.23 The
existing diversity of key concepts within the company laws of various
EU Member States will not be easily overcome through any attempts
to harmonize takeover regulation on an EU level.24 The ‘role of the
company’, for example, is a concept that varies significantly across
EU countries.25 The definition of ‘shareholders interests’ as such is
also hard to define from a practical point of view, as shareholders are
not always seen as a homogenous group.26
The legal consequences that flow from the application of the
articles in the Takeover Directive, which provide for information
being transmitted by the bidding company to the employees of the
target company, are arguably of minimal value, as they do not form
part of a more all-inclusive framework protecting firm-specific
investments. Considering that there is no legal duty, in company and
securities law, or beyond, on shareholders to consider such issues, any
obligation imposed on the offeree and the offeror boards in trans-
mitting information regarding the impact of the bid on employees or
on the business of the company in general, is considered useless,
unless complemented by a broader framework that takes into account
the value of firm-specific investments. Within the present legal fra-
mework, the likelihood of shareholders acting in their individual
capacity to consider the impact of the acquisition on employees when
making their decision about accepting or rejecting a bid is also
arguably significantly low.27 The Winter Report reaffirms this posi-
tion explaining that regulating the obligations towards employees’
rights during a takeover bid was not the focus of the Takeover
Directive.28 On this point, Vos and Heynen conclude that despite the
Takeover Directive’s provisions that allow for communication of
information from both the offeror and offeree company to employ-
ees, it is evident to those familiar with the community’s labour laws
that the information communicated is, overall, of minimal value.29
In this respect, they advocate that the application of complementary
to the Directive legislation for the safeguard of employees is
essential.30
19 Article 6(3) (i) of the EU Takeover Directive.
20 Amendment 5 of the European Parliament voted 13 Dec. 2000, after second reading.
21 J. Wouters, P.V. Hooghten, & M. Bruyneel, ‘The European Takeover Directive: A Commentary’, in The European Takeover Directive and Its Implementation, ed. P.V. Hooghten
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 3–76.
22 B. Clarke, ‘Takeover Regulation: Through the Regulatory Looking Glass’ CLPE Research Paper 18/2007, vol. 03, No. 05 (2007), Issue: EU Governance, 15, available at <http://
ssrn.com/abstractid¼1002675>.
23 J. Winter et al., ‘Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids in the European Union’ (2002), 19, available at<http://ec.europa.eu/
internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/2002-01-hlg-report_en.pdf>; also see B. Sja˚fjell, Towards a Sustainable European Company Law:A Normative Analysis of the
Objectives of EU Law, with the Takeover Directive as a Test Case (Kluwer Law International, 2009), 326–336, who questions the validity of such an assumption.
24 T. Jenkinson & C. Mayer, Hostile Takeovers: Defence, Attack and Corporate Governance (UK: McGraw-Hill International Limited, 1994), 26.
25 See Sja˚fjell, 2009, supra n. 23, 21–35, 103–110.
26 Ibid., 85.
27 Ibid., 357.
28 See Winter et al., 2002, supra n. 23, 16.
29 M.D.Vos & J. Heynen, ‘Employee Participation and Takeovers under EC Law’, in The European Takeover Directive and Its Implementation, ed. P.V. Hooghten (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009), 102.
30 Ibid., 101–102.
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4. A BRITISH PARADIGM: CSR IN THE SPOTLIGHT POST THE
CADBURY VERSUS KRAFT TAKEOVER
Kraft acquired Cadbury on 2 February 2010 with an aim of increas-
ing its global presence and revenue. The deal qualifies as an impor-
tant case study for the purposes of our discussion of the possible
revision of the EU Takeover Directive, as it prompted the reform of
the UK Takeover Rules arguably towards a more stakeholder-
oriented model.31 In view of the fact that most of the default rules
encompassed in the Takeover Directive are a reflection of the rules
found in the UK City Code on Takeovers and Mergers, it is worth
examining whether the discussions focusing on the Code’s reform in
2011 are likely to have any impact on proposals of the revision of the
equivalent EU rules. The takeover of Cadbury PLC by the US mul-
tinational Kraft Foods Inc. in 2010 highlighted the importance of the
bidder’s undertakings towards the target’s workforce and the target
company’s commitments to CSR.32
During the takeover process, the media had exemplified Cadbury
PLC as a highly ethical company committed to CSR practices
through its commitment to its employees and customers, as well as
to producers of third world countries through the use of Fairtrade
cocoa in the production of two of its most popular brands.33 In its
attempt to restore its damaged reputation after the reported use of
cocoa from slave farms located in West Africa in 2000, Cadbury
began to assume a more ethical approach towards its business
practices in 2002.34 In 2005, Cadbury made an important step
towards increasing its CSR by taking over Green & Blacks, a choco-
late manufacturing company known for its production of organic
and fair trade labelled products.35 Particularly prior to the takeover
bid launched by Kraft in 2009, Cadbury exemplified a significantly
active approach towards CSR through its launch of a GBP 44 million
Cocoa Partnership in 2008 ‘to secure the economic, social and
environmental sustainability of around a million cocoa farmers and
their communities in Ghana, India, Indonesia, and the Caribbean’
and its commitment in 2009 to use Fairtrade cocoa in its top-selling
Dairy Milk brand.36
Following Cadbury’s commitments to CSR policies, it was not
unwarranted that the launch of a takeover for Cadbury PLC in 2009
by multinational Kraft Food Inc. created fury among the British
community. The bid by Kraft gave rise to fears that in the absence of
legal requirements compelling successful bidders to respect Cad-
bury’s commitments to its workforce, research and development, and
overall CSR policies, Kraft Foods would divest itself of Cadbury’s
good business practices in the event of a successful bid and carry on
business with a less committed approach towards social values.37 Post
the acquisition, Kraft did in fact commit to continue Cadbury’s
support for the Cocoa Partnership and its undertaking to extend
Cadbury’s use of Fairtrade possibly due to the fury generated by
the media, trade unions, and the House of Commons.38 Despite
Kraft’s overall commitment to continuing Cadbury’s CSR practices,
certain evidence of a CSR change to the worse months after the
successful acquisition did in fact follow. As reported in January 2011,
one of Cadbury’s most popular brands with a strong business
ethics agenda, Green & Blacks, was struggling to maintain its funda-
mental CSR as part of Kraft and was awaiting a management buyout
to salvage its CSR-friendly business at that time.39 Kraft, however,
rejected such a proposal and declared its commitment to keep
Green & Blacks as a part of its group.40 The alignment of Cadbury’s
and Green & Black’s CSR values had been managed successfully, as
both companies were, prior to their integration, already strongly
committed to using fair trade commodities in their manufacturing.41
Whether Kraft will successfully align its CSR values with those of
Cadbury in general and particularly those of Green & Blacks remains
to be seen.
A major undertaking that Kraft had not complied with post its
successful acquisition of Cadbury was its commitment to keep the
Cadbury Somerdale factory open, which Cadbury had previously
31 G. Fairfield & H. Smith, ‘The UK Takeover Regime: Significant Changes to the Takeover Code’ (London: September 2011), available at<www.iflr1000.com/LegislationGuide/662/
The-UK-takeover-regime-significant-changes-to-the-Takeover-Code.html>, last visited January 2012.
32 A.S. Kalirai, Partner at Field Fisher Waterhouse, ‘Post Cadbury-Kraft Takeover Changes Force Advisers to Rethink Strategies’, Commentary, 15 Sep. 2011, available at
<www.legalweek.com/legal-week/analysis/2108920/post-cadbury-kraft-takeover-changes-force-advisers-rethink-strategies>, last visited January 2012.
33 S. Carrell, ‘Cadbury Takeover Raises Doubts over Kraft’s Business Ethics’, The Guardian, 20 Jan. 2010, available at <www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/jan/20/cadbury-kraft-
takeover-fair-trade>, last visited January 2012.
34 M. Blowfield & A. Murray, Corporate Responsibility, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 51–52, who report on Cadbury’s support of a study by the International
Institute of Tropical Agriculture investigating the extent of child labour and forced labour in 2002, as well as Cadbury’s joining the international cocoa initiative, which aimed at
abolishing unacceptable labour practices in cocoa production; Cadbury’s acquisition of Green & Blacks, a company producing organic chocolate and observing high-standard
business practices towards its consumers, in 2005, also added value to Cadbury’s efforts to qualify as an ‘ethical company’.
35 C. Muspratt, ‘Cadbury Gobbles Up Green & Black’s’, The Telegraph, 13 May 2005, available at <www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2915574/Cadbury-gobbles-up-Green-and-Blacks.
html>, last visited January 2012.
36 Blowfield & Murray, 2011, supra n. 34, 51–52.
37 R. Wachman, ‘Kraft Takeover Could Be Bitter Experience for Cadbury’, The Guardian, 20 Sep. 2009, available at <www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/sep/20/kraft-cadbury-
takeover-fears>; House of Commons, ‘Business, Innovation and Skills Committee Mergers, Acquisitions and Takeovers: The Takeover of Cadbury by Kraft’, Ninth Report of
Session 2009–2010, Report together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence (The Stationary Office Limited: London, 30 Mar. 2010), 12–20.
38 See House of Commons Ninth Report of Session 2009-2010, supra n. 37, 29–30.
39 L. Lucas, ‘Green & Black’s Executives Eye Buy-Out’, The Financial Times, 16 Jan. 2011, available at <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c1428cf6-21a2-11e0-9e3b-00144feab49a.
html#axzz1jHXai4Rr>, last visited January 2012; also see A. Vijayaraghavan, ‘Corporate Takeovers: How to Align CSR Values?’, available at <www.justmeans.com/Corporate-
Takeovers-How-Align-CSR-Values/42846.html>, last visited January 2012.
40 L. Lucas & A. Rappeport, ‘Mergers and Acquisitions: A Bitter Taste’, The Financial Times, 23 May 2011, available at <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/03559624-8571-11e0-ae32-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1jHXai4Rr>, last visited January 2012.
41 D. Bailey, ‘Green and Blacks Try to Escape Kraft’, 17 Jan. 2011, available at<http://blogs.birminghampost.net/business/2011/01/green-blacks-try-to-escape-kra.html>, last visited
January 2012.
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earmarked for closure. In its original statement, Kraft had com-
mitted to keep the Cadbury Somerdale factory open, but after the
successfully completed takeover, Kraft announced that it was no
longer able to comply with its undertaking.42 Its withdrawal from
that particular commitment resulted in distrust not only towards
Kraft but also towards takeovers and their social implications in
general. Kraft’s non-compliance with keeping the Somerdale factory
open was condemned by the House of Commons, which found that
Kraft’s actions had undoubtedly damaged its reputation in the UK
and its relationship with Cadbury’s employees.43 In legal terms,
however, what was of importance was not the closure of the said
facility as such but rather Kraft’s failure to comply with the particular
undertaking.44 According to the Panel, Kraft backing out of its prior
commitment was the result of Kraft not having observed high stan-
dards of care and accuracy in the information communicated to the
target shareholders in its offer regarding its prospective business
plans for Cadbury, which thus held Kraft in breach of Rule 19.1 of
the Takeover Code.45
The call for a reform of the UK takeover rules followed. Preceding
the reform of the UK takeover rules, Lord Mandelson, the Secretary
of State for Business, Innovation and Skills in the UK in 2010,
proclaimed the need for reform of UK rules on takeover bids and
directors’ duties in order to promote long-term engagement and
ownership among shareholders and boards.46 The takeover high-
lighted, among others, the fact that target boards in general fail to
consider the company’s long-term interests and the long-term
implications of the takeover bid in their advice of the bid to share-
holders.47 The Department for Business Innovation and Skills pro-
ceeded by issuing a policy document entitled A Long-Term Focus for
Corporate Britain: A Call for Evidence’ in October 2010 with an aim
of understanding whether and to what extent the UK system fosters
the long-term growth of corporations or whether it undermines it.48
The consultation sought to specifically explore, among others,
whether boards understand the long-term implications of takeovers
and if so, whether they communicate the long-term implications of
bids effectively.49 A summary of responses to the review document
was published in March 2011.50 There were mixed responses about
whether boards understand the long-term implications of takeovers,
and it was overall found that there was a difficulty for target boards:
‘in not recommending an offer to shareholders if it offered a high
(and often excessive) price’, as ‘boards would find it difficult to
explain why such a bid should not be accepted’.51 Other key obser-
vations made were that investors are often driven by short-term
returns and that boards are often guided by the strict dictum of
‘Shareholder value’.52 Certain respondents recommended that the
Takeover Code should be better linked to section 172 of the Com-
panies Act 2006 with regard to directors duties, although on this
point other responses questioned whether the said section would be
effective in guiding the decision-making process amidst a takeover,
and recommended a further study of its efficacy within this context.53
Certain respondents were in favour of more disclosure on the long-
term implications of a bid, while others considered the information
that boards provide to be, as stated: ‘too backward-looking and
focused on historical information’.54 In March 2011, the Takeover
Panel Code Committee proposed that it would make amendments so
as to provide greater recognition of the interests of offeree company
employees.55 The House of Commons also recommended that target
directors take into consideration the rights of employees when
deciding on the merits of a bid.56
The Takeover Panel Code Committee had also considered the
proposal of outlining the factors that target boards should take into
account when constructing their recommendation of a bid to target
42 See House of Commons, Ninth Report of Session 2009–2010, supra n. 37, 5.
43 Ibid., 10–11.
44 Note that the closure of the Somerdale facility was already on Cadbury’s agenda, so it would have been realized even in the event that Cadbury had remained independent.
45 Panel Statement, Kraft Foods Inc. Offer for Cadbury Plc 2010/14, available at <www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/2010-14.pdf>, whereby the Panel
applied an objective and subjective test to Kraft’s statement, thus holding the company accountable for breach of Rule 19.1 of the Code.
46 Lord Mandelson, Speech 1 Mar. 2010, Manor House, available at <www.totalpolitics.com/speeches/economics/economic-policy/35208/lord-mandelson-mansion-house-
speech.thtml>, last visited January 2012.
47 T. Webb, ‘Lord Mandelson Calls for Overhaul of Takeover Rules’, The Guardian, 1 Mar. 2010; Panel Statement 2010/22, ‘Code Committee: Review of Certain Aspects of the
Regulation of Takeover Bids’, section 2.5, 3, available at <www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/2010-221.pdf>.
48 Department for Business Innovation and Skills, ‘A Long-Term Focus for Corporate Britain: A Call for Evidence’, available at<www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-law/docs/l/
10-1225-long-term-focus-corporate-britain.pdf>, October 2010, 33, issued by the Department for Business Innovation and Skills with an aim of understanding whether and to
what extent the UK system fosters the long-term growth of corporations or whether it undermines it (see aims, 4–5).
49 Ibid.
50 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, Summary of Responses, ‘A Long-Term Focus for Corporate Britain’, March 2011, available at <www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/
business-law/docs/s/11-797-summary-responses-long-term-focus-corporate-britain.pdf>; also see briefing on Consultation at <www.bis.gov.uk/Consultations/a-long-term-
focus-for-corporate-britain>, which reports that following the responses to the call for evidence that identified a number of issues with short termism, the Secretary of State
commissioned an independent review to examine investment in UK equity markets and its impact on the long-term performance and governance of UK quoted companies to
Professor John Kay, who is to deliver his findings in February 2012.
51 Ibid., 21.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., 22.
54 Ibid.
55 Panel Statement 2011/08, ‘The Takeover Panel Code Committee: Review of Certain Aspects of the Regulation of Takeover Bids: Proposed Amendments to the Takeover Code’,
points (d)(i) and (ii), 2, available at <www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2011-8.pdf>.
56 See House of Commons, Ninth Report of Session 2009–2010, supra n. 37, 3.
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shareholders, but the motion of outlining these factors in the Code
by amending its current provisions failed, as the majority of the
Committee considered that the takeover rules should not be too
prescriptive within this context.57 The Panel did, however, recognize
that market participants are under the misconception that the
determining factor when considering whether to recommend a bid
or not is the offer price, so it committed itself to exclude the offer
price as the sole determining factor in recommending a bid.58
In relation to the recommendation provided by target directors to
shareholders on the merits of the bid, the new edition of the Take-
over Code published in September 2011 has added an extra inter-
pretive text, which now reads:
The provisions of the Code do not limit the factors that the board
of the offeree company may take into account in giving its
opinion on the offer in accordance with Rule 25.2(a). In parti-
cular, when giving its opinion, the board of the offeree
company is not required by the Code to consider the offer
price as the determining factor and is not precluded by the Code
from taking into account any other factors which it considers
relevant.59
The concerns brought forward by Cadbury’s takeover by Kraft in
the UK in relation to the protection of employees, target board
recommendations, and CSR practices may prove to have an impact
on discussions relating to the revision of the EU Takeover Directive’s
stakeholder-oriented provisions.60
5. THE SYMBIOSIS OF TAKEOVERS AND CSR
The theoretical function of takeovers is to correct managerial failure
and oust underperforming companies from the market.61 Whether
the objectives of the promotion of CSR and the facilitation of take-
overs can co-exist is highly dependant on the evaluation of the
company, that is, whether the share price does in fact also encompass
available information on CSR. Key to the proper function of an open
market for corporate control is that stock markets behave rationally,
so that share prices reflect the company’s performance and future
prospects.62 Not all relevant information on CSR practices is pub-
lically available however, as companies do not yet systematically
report on their People and Planet achievements.63 The reporting is
also not yet comparable per industry, nor in time, nor is it fully
verified by independent authorities. Thus, if markets cannot ‘value’
CSR, then it is fair to assert that a prioritization in research and
development, for example, would not allow for a high share price,
making a company more susceptible to the threat of a takeover.64
The symbiosis of takeover activity and CSR is also highly depen-
dant on the time horizon observed by directors in maximizing
shareholder value. The debate of short-term versus long-term atti-
tudes observed in investments and corporate strategies have been a
focal point in discussions on corporate governance ever since the
2008 financial crisis emerged.65 Financial institutions have been
particularly concerned with reporting on CSR and sustainable busi-
ness practices post the 2008 financial crisis, in light of banks’
damaged reputations preceding state bank bail-outs.66 Strine finds
57 Panel Statement 2010/22, ‘The Takeover Panel Code Committee: Review of Certain Aspects of the Regulation of Takeover Bids’, point (ii) section 5.2.1., 16, available at
<www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/2010-221.pdf>.
58 Ibid., point (ii) s. 5.2.2.
59 See The City Code, 10th edn, supra n. 7; notes on Rule 25.2 point 1 on Factors which may be taken into account.
60 B. Clarke, ‘Directors’ Duties During an Offer Period: Lessons from the Cadbury PLC Takeover’, UCDWorking Papers in Law, Criminology & Socio-Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 44/2011 (11 Feb. 2011), 12, available at <ssrn.com/abstract¼1759953>, last visited January 2012.
61 H.G. Manne, ‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’, The Journal of Political Economy (1965): 73; J.E. Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of
Company Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 156; R. Romano, ‘A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation’, Yale Journal on Regulation 9 (1992): 119–179; on the
last point, however, see Sja˚fjell, 2009, supra n. 23, 326–336, whereby it is explained that the assumption of takeovers functioning as purported in theory may be questioned, as
empirical evidence is inconclusive.
62 M. Wachter, ‘Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) Relatively Efficient’, Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 02-19 (2002), 15, available at<http://
ssrn.com/abstract¼330620>, last visited January 2012; also see M. Martynova & L. Renneboog, ‘A Century of Corporate Takeovers: What Have We Learned and Where Do We
Stand?’ (2005), 15, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract¼820984>, last vsited January 2012, who report on the overall wealth effects assumed to be created by takeovers, finding
that the stark difference between the decrease of wealth effects in the long run as opposed to the increased wealth effects at and around the announcement period of the bid is
attributed to methodological problems and problems related to the market efficiency assumption, namely that short-term studies based on this theory may overestimate the gains
during the announcement period, while studies that take place in the aftermath of the acquisition have obtained more information about the takeovers, subsequently reassessing
the expectations on returns from positive to negative.
63 K. Greenfield, ‘New Principles for Corporate Law’, Boston College Law School Faculty Papers, Paper (2005), 56, 90, available at <http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp/56>, last
visited January 2012, who reports on the problematic way in which financial reporting is conducted; also see R.I. Tricker, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies, and Practices
(Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 350, whereby it is explained that companies are still first and foremost concerned in reporting on their economic responsibility,
showing that that they are ‘profit orientated and market driven’; also see M. Wembridge, ‘Without Uniform, Reliable Rules, CSR Reports Will be Read with a Grain of Salt’, The
Financial Times, 15 Jun. 2011, available at<www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5a5366c4-8088-11e0-adca-00144feabdc0.html>, last visited January 2012, where it is explained that CSR reviews,
unlike annual reports, lack a standardized formula and that companies report on their CSR by using voluntary sustainability reporting guidelines, such as those developed by the
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) or ‘the Equator Principles’.
64 See Sja˚fjell, 2009, supra n. 23, 339; also see J.A. McCahery et al., The Economics of the Proposed European Takeover Directive, Research Report in Finance and Banking (Centre for
European Policy Studies, 2003), on the importance of the social costs factor in the construction of takeover regulation, as takeovers as such give priority to the financial
sustainability of corporations within the market, aiming to increase efficiency by relocating assets to more effective management.
65 S.C.Y. Wong, ‘Long-Term versus Short-Term Distinction in UK Takeover Review Misses the Point’ (2010), 2, available at <www.ssrn.com/abstract¼1662610>; also see
Department for Business Innovation and Skills, ‘A Long-Term Focus for Corporate Britain: A Call for Evidence’, supra n. 48.
66 See Wembridge, 2011, supra n. 63.
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that the problem can be narrowly identified in the fact that present
scholarship has failed to address new market phenomena, namely:
1) separation of ownership from ownership’67 and ‘2) the emer-
gence of reaggregated forms of aggressive capital, largely uncon-
strained by legal or equitable duties to other stockholders or
society as a whole.68
As Strine explains, following such phenomena, with the board of
directors having become highly sensitive to serving stockholders’
unconstrained short-term interests, it is subsequent that there has
been underinvestment in future growth.69 Actors, such as hedge
funds, which only emerged in significant numbers in recent years,
have made the need to address short termism in corporate invest-
ments imminent.70 The short time horizon in realizing profits is one
of the reasons takeovers work as an impediment to the creation or
preservation of implicit contracts that aim to secure profits in the
long term.71 For the purposes of progressing with restructuring
freely, the corporate raider is normally not obligated by corporate
law to continue any implicit contracts formed with stakeholders of
the company during previous management.72 If, however, it is the
company’s purpose to maintain ‘a long-term sustainable vision’
despite investors coming in and out of the company on a frequent
basis, then it should be important for directors’ to be aware of the
company’s exact strategy and disclose it to investors in the interim,73
as well as to a prospective acquirer.
The quality and accuracy of the information on the corporations’
business exchanged between the target and the acquiring company
also play a crucial role in the development of CSR strategies, parallel to
takeover activity occurring. Due diligence assessments, that is, the
evaluation process to determine the value of a company before a bid is
launched, are considered to constitute semi-legal frameworks through
which the development and implementation of CSR can be realized.74
In this respect, the rules related to the type of information that target
shareholders are provided with are of significant importance.75
The analysis above has signalled that there are sub-issues that
should be taken into account when discussing the European Com-
mission’s parallel objectives of promoting CSR, as well as facilitating
takeovers. Encompassing information on CSR practices in the share
price, keeping directors’ corporate strategies distinct from stock-
holders’ short-term interests, as well as protecting the value already
invested in CSR post a change in corporate control by promoting the
exchange of accurate and complete information between target and
acquirer, are all issues that one need to bear in mind when consid-
ering proposals for the revision of the Takeover Directive further on
in section 6.
5.2. Practical Issues: Building the Case for CSR
Irrespective of arguments in favour or against the adoption of CSR
provisions in the Takeover Directive,76 the need for legal certainty
and the need to address temporal market failures are both arguments
that would support a ‘stakeholder friendly’ reform of the Directive.
Such proposals are in line with the Commission’s goals, both its aim
to promote CSR and secure certain objectives of the EU Takeover
Directive itself.77
67 L.E. Strine, ‘One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term unless Their Powerful Electorates also Act and Think
Long Term?’, The Business Lawyer 66 (November 2011), whereby Strine explains earlier on in his article what he means by the separation of ‘ownership from ownership’ by stating
that ‘individual Americans don’t wield control over who sits on the boards of public companies. The financial intermediaries who invest their capital do. These intermediaries have
powerful incentives – in important instances, not of their own making – to push corporate boards to engage in risky activities that may be adverse to the interest of long-term investors and
society. That is, there is now a separation of ‘‘ownership from ownership’’ that creates conflicts of its own that are analogous to those of the paradigmatic, but increasingly outdated, Berle-
Means model for separation of ownership from control’.
68 Ibid., 9.
69 Ibid., 16.
70 A. Wells, ‘Takeovers and Mergers. Are You a Cadbury’s Fruit and Nut Case?’, Business Law Review (May 2011), 114.
71 See Jenkinson & Mayer, 1994, supra n. 24, 15, who find that a company’s vulnerability to hostile takeovers is what undermines the ‘long-term operation of firms’, as managers and
employees become averse to developing specialized skills, as well as training; with reference to employees in particular, see Jenkinson & Mayer, 1994, supra n. 24, 16–17, whereby
authors make a distinction between implicit and explicit contracts formed under the company umbrella. Implicit contracts are understandings based on trust and cannot be
enforced through the application of law and litigation in courts; also see Fannon, 2003, supra n. 9. 83–84, whereby the protection of firm-specific investments is assumed to
encourage commitment on the part of employees, productivity, and competitiveness, but it is argued that human-specific investments that deserve protection should be assessed
on a case-by-case basis.
72 J. Mukwiri, Takeovers and the European Legal Framework: A British Perspective (London and New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009), 88.
73 M. Scott, ‘Short-Termism Requires Long-Term Vision’, The Financial Times, 16 Jan. 2011.
74 T. Lambooy, Corporate Social Responsibility: Legal and Semi-Legal Frameworks Supporting CSR Developments 2000–2010 and Cases Studies (Kluwer, 2010), Phd Thesis Universiteit
Leiden, 29–30 and 39.
75 See Art. 3(b), Art. 6 and Art. 8 of the European Takeover Directive with regard to the information that needs to be provided to target shareholders for them in order to reach a
properly informed decision on the bid.
76 For arguments against the revision of EU Takeover Directive with reference to the inclusion of more stakeholder-friendly provisions, see Winter et al., 2002, supra n. 23; main
arguments are that the EU Takeover Directive only needs to provide that during a takeover bid, a fair process shall be observed for investors in order for them to make an informed
decision on the merits of the bid and that other areas of law can properly deal with externalities that the firms may create (the inclusion of rules on socially responsible behaviour
being observed and continued by the target firm is not necessary to the effective facilitation of takeovers); also see Blowfield &Murray, 2011, supra n. 34, 323, whereby an additional
argument against the inclusion of provisions of CSR is that such provisions will over-regulate the market, not allowing it to operate freely; for arguments not in favour of the strict
shareholder focused provisions in the corpus of the Directive, see A. Johnston, ‘The European Takeover Directive: Ruined by Protectionism or Respecting Diversity’, Co Law 25
(2004): 270, and see Sja˚fjell, 2009, supra n. 23; arguments on latter view are, in general, that ‘fair process’ during a takeover bid needs be observed for other stakeholders in the
corporation and other areas of law cannot properly deal with externalities that the firms may create during a takeover, whereby special factual circumstances will arise.
77 The author participated at the Convention on Takeover and Mergers, which was hosted by the Austrian Takeover Commission Convention in Vienna on 9 Sep. 2011, at which
Convention the law firmMarcuus Partners, represented by C. Clerc & F. Demarigny, presented a preliminary brief overview of their research on the Study of the application of the
EU Takeover Directive in Power Point format, which is on file with the current author; on this point, see Preliminary Briefing of the proposed Study, Power Point Slide 18, whereby
APRIL 2012, VOLUME 9, ISSUE 2 76 EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW
The provisions identified in section 3 are problematic insofar as
they broadly reflect the need to safeguard a company’s socially
responsible behaviour but are of minimal practical value in terms of
safeguarding it. The need for legal certainty should prompt regula-
tors to redefine key concepts in the Takeover Directive and elaborate
on target directors’ advisory role during a takeover bid.78 The sig-
nificance attached to target board recommendations is supported by
empirical studies that find such recommendations as being the most
important variable in determining takeover outcomes.79 Defining
the target directors’ advisory role80 in the EU Takeover Directive
may thus well help secure fairer outcomes not only for investors but
also ultimately for all parties affected by a change in corporate
control.
Recent market failures indicate a dysfunctional market for cor-
porate control, and this in turn has led policymakers to question
whether the present legal framework does in fact threaten long-term
growth. Non-available information on social costs or, in general, the
long-term value of investments in the share price, which is used as an
indicator of managerial efficiency for the purposes of a takeover, may
be the cause of a dysfunctional market for corporate control, and in
this respect CSR as a notion can be viewed as a way of addressing the
imperfections and failures of markets.81 As explained:
efficient resource allocation depends on markets yielding prices
that reflect true social costs; when they fail to do so, such as when
polluters fail to pay the cost, then the invisible hand can lead one
in the wrong direction . . . Therefore instead of seeing corporate
social responsibility as an assault on free markets, it can be argued
that it will ultimately make markets, or at least companies more
efficient.82
In considering all such factors, it is appreciated that the Takeover
Directive is not an all-encompassing regulatory tool with an aim of
addressing all legitimate concerns that may arise from a change in
corporate control.83 What falls within the ambit of the Takeover
Directive, however, is to identify key concepts and prescribe what
the directors of the offeree company should report on when recom-
mending a bid to the company’s shareholders, as well what type
of information the bidding and target companies are under a duty
to disclose about its own CSR policy, strategy, programmes, and their
implementation.
6. CSR AND THE REFORM OF THE EU TAKEOVER DIRECTIVE
84
6.1. Data on the Takeover Directive’s Revision
Article 20 of the Takeover Directive stipulates that five years after the
deadline of the implementation of the Directive, the European
Commission shall review the Directive: ‘in light of the experience
acquired in applying it and, if necessary, propose its revision’. Thus
following Article 20 of the Takeover Directive, the Commission
commissioned a study on the application of the Directive in autumn
201085 to the French law firm Marcuus Partners.86 General issues to
be addressed are, according to the preliminary brief overview of their
research on the Takeover Directive: ‘clarity of the obligations
imposed by the legislation, appropriateness of the legislation, disclo-
sure and takeover bid procedure’, as well as ‘employee protection’.87
Social and environmental concerns were also referenced.88
In their economic analysis of the application of the Takeover
Directive, the preliminary briefing of Marcuus Partners refers to the
community control gap, which, as explained, increases the risk of
negative externalities imposed by shareholders. The possible solu-
tions outlined to mitigate such a risk are to restrict the free market for
corporate control, to enhance community protection through
increased regulation of company activities and increased account-
ability of shareholders, or finally to call upon management to act in
it is outlined that the protection of different constituencies constitutes one of the objectives of the EU Takeover Directive, namely, see second point, which states: protection of the
interests of shareholders, in particular minority shareholder, employees and other stakeholders, when a company is subject to a takeover bid for control.
78 Ibid., namely, see first point, whereby the need for legal certainty was also emphasized, as it was in particular stated that legal certainty on the handling of takeover bids and
Community-wide clarity and transparency in respect of takeover bids.
79 P. Holl & D. Kyriazis, ‘The Detriments of Outcome in UK Take-Over Bids’, International Journal of Economic Business 3, no. 2 (1996): 165, 168; P. Wong & N. O’Sullivan, ‘The
Determinants and Consequences of Abandoned Takeovers’, Journal of Economic Surveys 15, no. 2 (2001): 145–186, 156; H. Eddy & R.S. Casey, ‘Director’s Recommendations in
Response to Takeover Bids: Do They Act in Their Own Interests?’, Australian Journal of Management (1989): 26.
80 See Lord Hoffman, ‘Directors’ Duties’, in Developments in European Company Law, V.3/1999: Directors’ Conflicts of Interest: Legal, Socio-Legal and Economic Analyses, eds Andrenas &
Sugarman, 1st edn (London: Kluwer International Law, 2000), whereby it is explained that within a takeover context, the board of an offeree company will not only be subject to the
provisions of the EU Takeover Directive, as transposed into national law, but will also be subject to a combination of national case law, statutory and self-regulation rules.
81 Blowfield & Murray, 2011, supra n. 34, 358.
82 Ibid., 358.
83 Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) is also of importance to the facilitation of CSR practices but is a matter that falls outside the ambit of the revision of the Takeover Directive
and needs to be addressed via other regulatory means and policy choices that can encourage more socially responsible investment; on how SRI can allow for CSR to develop side by
side with the facilitation of the benefits that takeover as an external corporate governance mechanism is assumed to offer, see Sja˚fjell, 2009, supra n. 23, 476.
84 ‘Reform of EU Takeover Directive and of German Takeover Law’, Survey Report, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP (November 2011), 14, available at <www.freshfields.com/
publications/pdfs/2011/nov11/31663.pdf>, according to which most respondents were of the view that in order to create the desired level playing field, amendments of the EU
Takeover Directive itself would be preferred to rulemaking by private codices, European Commission recommendations, or other soft law instruments.
85 European Commission Minutes of the meeting of 11 Feb. 2011 (Brussels, European Corporate Governance Forum, 7 Mar. 2011), available at <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_-
market/company/docs/ecgforum/minutes-20110211_en.pdf>.
86 See The City Code, 10th edn, supra n. 7; also see ‘Reform of EU Takeover Directive and of German Takeover Law’, Survey Report, supra n. 84, 1.
87 Supra n. 77, Power Point Slide 6.
88 Supra n. 77, Power Point Slide 15, whereby reference was made to the social and environmental concerns that have been laid down in the EU Company Law Action Plan 2003, as
well as the Commission’s vision for the single market in the twenty-first century, dated February 2007.
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the interests of the company as a whole.89 From all three options, the
present author proposes that the last option referred to need to be
the subject of reform in the Takeover Directive for the purposes of
safeguarding CSR practices parallel to the occurrence of takeover
activity.90
Also important to our discussion of the revision of the takeover
Directive with reference to CSR are the findings of Freshfields
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP Expert Survey Report on the ‘Reform of EU
Takeover Directive and of German Takeover Law’, dated November
2011.91 With regard to the role of the board of the offeree company,
the Survey reports that a clear majority of the respondents supported
a proposal to ‘grant the target company’s management a relatively
broad discretion in a takeover process by applying the so-called
business judgment rule’.92 The Survey Report also provides respon-
dents’ views on whether takeover law in the respondents’ jurisdiction
achieves the right balance between bidder, target management, target
shareholders, and other target stakeholders.93 From the respondents
who saw a misbalance between the different stakeholders’ interests
and who were asked about the balance that was struck by the takeover
laws in their home jurisdiction, the majority thought that the takeover
laws should better protect the interests of target shareholders – an
opinion strongly supported by representatives of academic research,
investment banks, and corporates – or better protect other
stakeholders – an opinion supported by institutional investors.94
6.2. Proposals for Additional Clauses in the EU Takeover
Directive
In the UK, the reform of the UK takeover rules prompted by the
takeover of Cadbury by Kraft in 2010 led to a revised 10th edition of
the Code, which came into effect on 19 September 2011.95 The
Panel’s commitment to exclude the offer price as the sole deter-
mining factor in recommending a bid has now made clear that target
directors are not to provide advice that is merely affixed to the
financial merits of the bid.96 In light of the proposed 2011 change, the
new interpretation of the section arguably gives target directors
greater leeway in referring to the interests of various constituencies in
their recommendation of a bid to target shareholders.97 In an attempt
to achieve a less arbitrary approach towards CSR on an EU level, the
first proposal for reform suggested by the present author is to refer to
the factors that need to be taken into account by the target board of
directors when giving advice to the target shareholders98 by making
similarly to the UK amendment clear that:
The provisions of the EU Takeover Directive do not limit the
factors that the board of the offeree company may take into
account in giving its opinion on the offer pursuant to their
obligation outlined in Article 9(5) of the Directive. In particular,
when giving its opinion, the board of the offeree company should
not be required to consider the offer price as the determining
factor and should not be precluded by national laws from taking
into account any other factors which it considers relevant.99
A provision as such would guide target directors in drafting their
statements towards shareholders and prompt target directors to refer
to the implicit versus explicit contracts set in place for employees or
the capital that has been invested in research and development plans
and that is not reflected in the share price but will nevertheless be
realized in the long term. Allowing directors to take other factors into
account, besides the share price, may well offer certain of the benefits
that the business judgment rule is perceived to offer in the US.100
Lipton and Rowe have found that the Delaware model ‘has protected
corporations and directors from pressure to respond to short-term
dislocations in the stock market’.101 Delaware managers have been
empowered with such a role during takeovers due to knowledge of
89 Supra n. 77, Power Point Slide 30.
90 Supra n. 77, Power Point Slide 22, whereby it is stated that the rules related to the protection of the target company are General Principle regarding the need to take into account the
interest of the target company taken as a whole, Publicity of the offeror’s intentions (future business of the offeree company and likely repercussions on employment), Opinion of the board
of the offeree company, Maximum Duration of a bid.
91 See ‘Reform of EU Takeover Directive and of German Takeover Law’, Survey Report, supra n. 84, 2.
92 Ibid., 5.
93 Ibid., 17, according to which the majority of all respondents thought that German takeover law achieves the right balance between the interests of all stakeholders involved in
public takeovers, although it was also noted that this general assessment varies significantly depending on the specific role and the political agenda of the respondent.
94 See ‘Reform of EU Takeover Directive and of German Takeover Law’, Survey Report, supra n. 84, 18.
95 See The City Code, 10th edn, supra n. 7.
96 S. Deakin & A. Singh, ‘The Stock Market, the Market for Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm: Legal and Economic Perspectives and Implications for Public Policy’,
Working Paper No. 365 (Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge, June 2008), 11, whereby it is explained that in the UK and prior to the 2011 amendment referred
to, target boards were not precluded from advising against a hostile bid on the grounds that the bid would be ‘contrary to a long-term strategy of building up the company’s
business in a particular way’ – however, as the authors further explain, the board had to nevertheless be cautious in stating such an opinion in light of the fact that it was still under
the duty by law to objectively and clearly report on the financial merits of the bid in question.
97 See Lambooy, 2010, supra n. 74, 117–118, who reports on the tension that exists between management’s responsibility towards the company’s interests, including CSR policies
and those of shareholders, an issue that was referred to but not addressed by the ‘Corporate Governance Code Monitoring Committee’ (Monitoring Committee) employed to
evaluate compliance with the ‘Tabaksblat Code’ (the Dutch Corporate Governance Code of December 2003 for listed companies).
98 For arguments against the general Multi-Fiduciary Approach, including problems with enforcement of the duties, see Fannon, 2003, supra n. 9, 71.
99 Present author’s note on proposal: a step forward would be to provide an outline of the factors to be taken into account and formulate a ‘minimum standard’ for
recommendations, allowing for the national legislator to provide for more expansive standards on reporting.
100 The business judgment rule is the main standard by which the target board’s actions are measured in Delaware and ultimately excludes directors from liability for any losses
incurred as a consequence of their decisions. Conditions for the rule to apply are that the board must have acted in good faith, in the benefit of the company, and within its
powers; for ‘Stakeholder Statutes’ in the US, see Fannon, 2003, supra n. 9, 69–70.
101 M. Lipton & P.K. Rowe, ‘Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to Professor Gilson’, Del. J. Corp. L. 27 (2002): 26.
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the company’s value and ability to respond to third parties in a way
that cannot be achieved by shareholders. Lipton and Rowe find that
in Time Warner102 and Unitrin103 cases, ‘the court’s acknowledg-
ment that directors can respond to the threat of ‘‘substantive coer-
cion’’’ is essentially a recognition that shareholders may ‘get it wrong’
because information about a company’s value may either not be fully
available or fully understood by all shareholders’.104 The present
author does however acknowledge the importance of the first prin-
ciple outlined in the Winter Report, that is, shareholder decision-
making, which allows the takeover to function as a disciplinary tool
for management, specifically with regard to companies with dis-
persed ownership structures.105 However, in consideration of the
fact that target directors hold an indirect power to defend against an
unwanted bid by using their ‘recommendation’ to possibly steer
target shareholders in one direction or another,106 it remains
important to allow for directors to construct a more ‘all stakeholder
inclusive’ opinion of a bid to shareholders.
The positive aspect of the vague term ‘company as a whole’ lies in
the fact that it encompasses the interests of the company both in its
broadest and narrowest sense, that is, the all encompassing approach
of stakeholders’ interests and the restricted approach of share-
holders’ interests, respectively,107 allowing thus Member States to
interpret the section with reference to their conception of what
constitutes ‘corporate interests’.108 However, in order to comple-
ment the first proposal made with regard to not limiting the factors
that target directors can take into account in their recommendations,
a second amendment is proposed by the present author, that is, to
elaborate on the term ‘in the interests of the company as a whole’, as
found in Article 3(1)(c), and ‘the company’s interests’, as found in
Article 9(5) of the Directive, providing for an autonomous inter-
pretation of the term.109 The proposal is to incorporate the following
text after the phrase ‘in the interests of the company as a whole’,
meaning ‘the interest of corporate policy and its continuation in the
long-term, with a view of safeguarding firm-specific investments and
CSR policies relevant to the firm’.110 Sja˚fjell supports the view that
the term should be given an autonomous interpretation, especially in
light of the fact that there is no pan-European consensus on the
term.111 By referring to certain provisions of the Directive that may
assist in providing a community-inspired interpretation of the
phrase, she arrives at the conclusion that the termmust in fact include
‘the company’s business (the interests of the enterprise), its employ-
ees, (possibly) the local communities and the shareholders’, which, as
further explained: ‘is also in line with the legal basis of the Directive,
Article 44(2)(g) EC, which expressly refers to the ‘‘protection of
the interests of members and others’’’.112
Following the implementation of the EU Takeover Directive in the
UK, the UK Takeover Code in General Principle 3 now also reads: ‘in
the interests of the company as a whole’, which may arguably allow
for broader corporate interests to be taken into account.113 Whether
the marked change of terms in the UK Code from ‘the shareholders
interests taken as a whole’, together with those of employees and
creditors’114 to the phrase ‘the company as a whole’ makes any
difference in safeguarding the company’s interests, including stake-
holders’ interests and CSR practices, is open to discussion.115 The
recent reform of the Takeover Rules that allow target boards to take
other corporate interests into account in their recommendation of a
bid to shareholders, and the proclamations made by the Department of
Business Innovation and Skills in promoting long-term growth for UK
firms, may allow for the term to be interpreted in its broadest sense.116
The 10th edition of the UK Code now requires greater disclosure
on the bidder’s part with regard to the impact of the offer on
the business of the offeree and offeror company.117 Prior to the
102 Paramount Communications Inc v. Time Inc 571 A.2d 1140 (Del., 1990).
103 Unitrin Inc v. America Gen. Corp. 651 A.2d 1361.
104 Lipton & Rowe, 2002, supra n. 101, 26.
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available at <www.oup.com/uk/orc/bin/9780199215942/resources/chapters/Web_Chapter_A.pdf>, 46–47.
109 Clarke, 2011, supra n. 60, 12, who also argues in favour of reconsidering the duty of the board of directors to act in the interests of the company as a whole, on an EU level, post the
takeover of Cadbury.
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112 Ibid., 350.
113 Deakin & Singh, 2008, supra n. 96, 11–12.
114 See 7th edition of the Takeover Code on Takeovers and Mergers, published 1 May 2002.
115 Kershaw, 2010, supra n. 108, 46–47; also see H. Smith, ‘Takeovers in the UK: Review of Topical Issues and Code Changes over the Last 12 Months’ (London: Corporate Briefing,
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amendment of the Takeover Code in September 2011, Clarke ques-
tioned the value of such disclosure requirements with reference to
employment by using Kraft’s failed commitment to keep the Som-
erdale facility open post its acquisition of Cadbury as a paradigm. In
specific, Clarke explained that the particular information on
employees was likely to be of limited value to target directors, since
section 172 or the 9th edition of the Code would not have allowed
them to take into account employees’ interests over those of share-
holders.118 However, through the prism of the new section in the
Code offering guidance on the factors that target boards can take
into account when drafting their recommendations, the disclosure
requirements may assist target directors in formulating a more ‘all-
inclusive’ opinion of a bid to target shareholders. Thus, a final
proposal suggested by the present author is to allow for an increase
in the information level of the offer document on an EU level as
well.119 Following the proposal of the minority view in the related
question in the Freshfields Survey Report, it is proposed that addi-
tional information be included in the offer documents and that this
obligation be outlined in the current version of the Takeover
Directive in Article 6 paragraph 3, numbered ‘(0)’, as one of the
matters that the bidder needs to address in the offer document.120
Specifically, the bidder should disclose ‘(i) information on its own
CSR policies, and in specific its strategy, programmes and results on
implementation, (ii) a detailed post-merger integration plan (in
particular with respect to management positions, employment
matters and CSR policies)’.121 Such provisions would qualify as
minimum standard provisions, allowing for national legislators to
impose higher standards on the information provided in the offer
document.122
The light regulatory touch recommended forms part of a broader
framework that would have markets reflect CSR values in the share
price, investors assessing the available information on CSR practices,
and a single EU supervisory authority administering takeover activ-
ity ensuring that the parties involved abide by the rules.123
7. CONCLUSION
Detailed provisions exclusively on CSR are highly unlikely to form
part of the Takeover Directive’s revision. This is due to a dual
difficulty in attaining political support on provisions that are likely
to be foreign to the legal regimes of certain EUMember States124 and
in empirically supporting the benefits that a provision on CSR would
offer when viewed as an attempt to over-regulate the market for
corporate control.
What can however be drawn from our analysis of the Cadbury
versus Kraft takeover and the Takeover Directive’s provisions
stakeholder-oriented provisions is that there is a need to redefine key
concepts within the EU Takeover Directive if the European Com-
mission truly aspires to promote socially responsible behaviour
among EU firms in a harmonized manner as set out in its 2011
objectives on CSR. The grey areas of law reported on imply that the
regulator is concerned with more than merely meets the eye, that is,
creating an open market for corporate control. Combating short
termism in corporate strategy and promoting socially responsible
behaviour alongside takeover facilitation are also on the agenda. The
takeover of Cadbury by Kraft highlighted that the protection of
socially responsible practices post a change in corporate control
matters. The implications for the revision of the EU Takeover
Directive brought forward by the particular takeover, as well as the
growing acceptance of CSR in today’s business practices, suggest that
the legislator should attempt to define key concepts, guide target
directors in formulating their opinion of a bid to shareholders, and
enact duties that would oblige the board of the offeree company, as
well as the board of the offeror company, to disclose more informa-
tion on the bid with particular reference to socially responsible
practices observed by both parties involved. In section 7, some sug-
gestions have been made for revision in this respect, on which the
author welcomes comments.
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